Intellectual Property Rights in an Attorney’s Work Product by Clifford, Ralph D.
University of Massachusetts Law Review
Volume 3
Issue 1 Trends and Issues in Intellectual Property Article 1
January 2008
Intellectual Property Rights in an Attorney’s Work
Product
Ralph D. Clifford
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/umlr
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Massachusetts Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School
of Law.
Recommended Citation
Clifford, Ralph D. (2008) "Intellectual Property Rights in an Attorney’s Work Product," University of Massachusetts Law Review: Vol. 3:




INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN 
ATTORNEY’S WORK PRODUCT 
 
RALPH D. CLIFFORD* 
 
“Can you tell me,” asked Sir John, “how long it 
took you to knock out that nocturne?” 
“Two days,” replied Whistler. 
“The labour of two days, then, is that for which 
you ask two hundred guineas?” 
“No,” replied Whistler, “I ask it for the 
knowledge of a lifetime.”1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper addresses the main intellectual property 
consequences of practicing law and whether attorneys can 
prevent others from using their work-product. The article does 
not assume that the reader is an expert in intellectual property 
law; instead, it is designed to answer the types of questions 
practitioners have about their rights. 
There is one primary legal code that impacts attorneys’ 
rights to their work-product: the copyright law.2  As a broad 
                                            
* Professor of Law, S. New England School of Law. The author would like 
to thank his colleague George Jacobs for his help with this paper and the 
always helpful staff of the Law Library for helping find the materials needed 
to produce this paper. 
1 EDWARD PARRY, MY OWN WAY 40 (1932). 
2 The current copyright law, the Copyright Act of 1976, is found in Title 
17 of the U.S. Code. 
There is increasing controversy about whether another intellectual 
property law system will become important to the practice of law – the patent 
law. See Gary C. Bubb, Patented Tax Strategies – Are You Serious?, MASS. 
LAWYERS WEEKLY, Aug. 6, 2007, at 47. Some law practice-related patents 
have been issued. See Establishing and Managing Grantor Retained Annuity 
Trusts Funded by Nonqualified Stock Options, U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 
(filed Dec. 1, 1999).  
It is unclear if this type of patent will survive legal challenges to the   
appropriateness of the patent. In In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2007), a patent was claimed on a method of imposing mandatory arbitration 
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statement, copyright law protects how an author expresses 
ideas.3   It is the system that is used to prevent others from 
copying a book, a movie, a musical composition, or even a 
computer program.4 It is almost exclusively a federal statutory 
remedy as comparable state protections have been preempted.5 
As much of what an attorney does is expressing ideas in writing, 
the copyright system is the most important method of protecting 
an attorney’s work-product. 
To clarify the discussion of copyright law and how it applies 
to legal drafting, three hypotheticals will be used. In each of 
these cases, the drafting attorneys may feel that their rights have 








                                                                                              
within a legal document such as a contract. See id. at 1368. The claims were 
ultimately rejected by the PTO as being obvious. See id. at 1370–71. When 
this determination was appealed to the Federal Circuit, the court affirmed the 
denial of the patent, but on grounds that call many legal practice patents into 
question. See id. at 1371. The Court ultimately held that 
 
 [i]t is thus clear that the present statute does not allow 
patents to be issued on particular business systems – such 
as a particular type of arbitration – that depend entirely on 
the use of mental processes. In other words, the patent 
statute does not allow patents on particular systems that 
depend for their operation on human intelligence alone, a 
field of endeavor that both the framers and Congress 
intended to be beyond the reach of patentable subject 
matter. Thus, it is established that the application of human 
intelligence to the solution of practical problems is not in 
and of itself patentable. 
 
Id. at 1378–79. Under this standard, it is highly doubtful that the ‘790 patent 
would be sustained if challenged in court. 
3 See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 
(1989). 
4 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
5 See id. § 301(a).  
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I.  HYPOTHETICALS 
 
A. The Brenda Maxim Hypothetical — 
                              Litigation Work-Products 
 
Brenda Maxim is a brilliant trial attorney in private practice. 
One of her cases, the Applejack case, presented an issue of 
whether the Rule Against Perpetuities was preempted by ERISA. 
She drafted and filed a memorandum of law6 that succinctly 
defined both areas of law and argued that such preemption did 
not occur. The judge was persuaded by the memorandum and 
ruled in favor of Brenda’s client Applejack following the 
reasoning Brenda had presented; indeed, the judge freely quoted 
from Brenda’s memorandum without attributing the quotes to 
her. Several months later, as Brenda was reading the week’s 
case summaries, she saw a synopsis of a litigation in another 
circuit that was based on the same law that had been decided in 
Applejack. Out of curiosity, she went online using her legal 
research service to read the new opinion. One of the options she 
was presented with was to read the brief that had been submitted 
to the court in the new case. She chose this option and found 
that the brief had quoted most of the one she had submitted in 
Applejack without attribution to her and certainly without her 
permission. When she then looked up the Applejack case she 
found that her brief had been loaded into the research system, 




                                            
6 The choice of a memorandum of law for this hypothetical is intentional 
as it is generally seen as among the most creative of the litigation documents 
an attorney prepares. See Davida H. Isaacs, The Highest Form of Flattery? 
Application of the Fair Use Defense Against Copyright Claims for 
Unauthorized Appropriation of Litigation Documents, 71 MO. L. REV. 391, 
406–10 (2006). Other legal documents – the motion to dismiss rather than the 
memorandum filed in support, for example – tend to be of such a set form 
that finding the minimal creativity required by Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991), would be 
impossible, or at least improbable. See Davida H. Isaacs, supra. 
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B.  The David Smith Hypothetical – 
Transactional Work-Products 
 
David Smith’s reputation as a transactional attorney matches 
Brenda’s as a trial attorney.7 He drafted a complicated sale and 
lease-back contract for one of his clients, Onetime Development 
LLP, a major real estate developer. Several months later, when 
representing another client, he was surprised to receive a 
contract from the opposing attorney, Howard, that was an exact 
copy of the Onetime contract with only the names, property 
address and purchase and lease amounts changed. When asked, 
Howard told David that his brother-in-law is the C.E.O. of 
Onetime and had given him the contract. When David 
questioned Howard about why Howard thought he could use the 
contract that had been drafted by another attorney, Howard gave 
him two answers: “Everybody does it,” and “Onetime paid for 
the contract and gave me permission to use it.” 
 
C.  The Henry King Hypothetical – 
                        Work-Products and Termination of 
                        Representation 
 
Henry King was retained by the Welbuilt Construction 
Company to represent it in a variety of matters. After a falling 
out between the parties, based in part on Welbuilt’s failure to 
pay Henry’s bills, Welbuilt terminated Henry as its attorney. 
Because of the nature of the representation, Henry has 
developed a wide variety of legal documents, some completed 
but others in various states of being drafted. Several days after 
his representation was terminated, he received a demand from 
Welbuilt’s new counsel that all documents being prepared be 
turned over immediately. 
                                            
7 The idea  for  this  hypothetical  came  from  Stanley  F.  Birch,  Jr., 
Copyright Protection for Attorney Work Product: Practical and Ethical 
Considerations, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 255 (2003). 
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II.  HOW COPYRIGHT LAW WORKS 
 
Copyright law is a system that protects the expression 
contained within an author’s work without protecting the 
underlying ideas and concepts that were expressed.8 
Distinguishing between the two, the protectable 
expression from the unprotectable idea, is not easy. As 
Learned Hand stated in the leading precedent on the 
difference: 
 
Upon any work, . . . a great number of patterns 
of increasing generality will fit equally well, 
as more and more of the incident is left out. 
The last may perhaps be no more than the 
most general statement of what the [work] is 
about, and at times might consist only of its 
title; but there is a point in this series of 
abstractions where they are no longer 
protected, since otherwise the [author] could 
prevent the use of his ‘ideas’, to which, apart 
from their expression, his property is never 
extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix 
that boundary, and nobody ever can. In some 
cases the question has been treated as though it 
were analogous to lifting a portion out of the 
copyrighted work; but the analogy is not a 
good one, because, though the skeleton is a 
part of the body, it pervades and supports the 
whole. In such cases we are rather concerned 
with the line between expression and what is 
expressed.9 
 
                                            
8 See 17 U.S.C. § 102; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), as 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 (“Copyright does not 
preclude others from using the ideas or information revealed by the 
author's work. It pertains to the literary, musical, graphic, or artistic form 
in which the author expressed intellectual concepts.”). 
9 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) 
(citations omitted). 
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As an example, consider Romeo and Juliet. On the idea 
side of the dichotomy is the basic plot line of boy meets the 
wrong girl and they both come to a tragic end. Any author is 
free to write a story based on that idea.10 On the other side are 
the actual words chosen by Shakespeare to tell his version of 
the story. The words and other details of the telling would be 
protected by the copyright. 
Copyright in the United States is an automatic system. No 
application for a copyright need be filed; instead, copyright 
protection is automatic whenever a “work of authorship [is] 
fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression.”11 There are only 
two requirements to obtain automatic copyright protection, 
therefore: (1) that a “work of authorship” be created and (2) 
that it is “fixed.” As fixation is the easier of the two requisites, 
it will be discussed first. 
 
A.  Is an Attorney’s Work-Product “Fixed?” 
 
In order for a work to be “fixed” under the Copyright Act, 
it must be placed in some tangible form for more than a 
transitory period.12  When the three hypothetical attorneys 
typed their respective work-products into their computer, or 
dictated it on a tape or digital recorder, or wrote it out on 
legal pads, the work would be considered fixed.13  With  the 
computer, the work is fixed in memory as it is typed in and 
on the disk when it is saved.14  Similarly, for the tape or 
                                            
10  See, e.g., WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE’S CHOICE (1979); ARTHUR 
LAURENTS, LEONARD BERNSTEIN, & STEPHEN SONDHEIM, WEST SIDE 
STORY (1957). 
11 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).  The Copyright Act uses the word 
“subsist” to describe the existence of a copyright. “Subsist” means “[t]o 
exist . . . to remain or continue in existence.” AMER. HERITAGE DICT. 
1791 (3d Ed. 1992). 
12 See id. §§ 102(a) and 101 (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium 
of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under 
the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it 
to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of 
more than transitory duration .  . .”). 
13 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 2.03[B] (2007) [hereinafter “NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT “]. 
14 See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855–56 (2d 
2008 Intellectual Property Rights 7 
  
digital recorder, it is fixed when the analog signals are 
magnetically recorded by the tape recorder or when the 
digital equivalents are stored in the memory of the digital 
recorder.15 The legal pad fixes the work when the ink binds 
with  the  paper  substrate.16  For all of  these  methods,  the 
expression made can be observed again which establishes 
fixation. 
In contrast, if the attorneys merely thought of the words 
or spoke them without recording them, no fixation would 
have occurred. When words are thought or spoken, they 
disappear and cannot be recaptured. 17   The copyright act 
requires that the words that constitute the work be 
“perceiv[able], reproduc[ible], or . . . communic[able]”18 for 
fixation to have occurred. As words that are just spoken or 
just conceived cannot be, fixation has not occurred. 
Consequently, most of the work-product of an attorney is 
fixed and has cleared the first hurdle towards copyrightability. 
Certainly, the memorandum, contract, and other documents in 
the three presented hypotheticals have been fixed. 
 
B.  Is an Attorney’s Work-Product a “Work of 
                 Authorship?” 
 
For a copyright to subsist, the creation must be a “work of 
authorship.” Although Congress did not define “work of 
authorship” in the Copyright Act, the legislative history 
                                                                                          
Cir. 1982) (holding that a video game was “fixed” in the memory chips of 
the computer); Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Arctic Intern., Inc., 685 F.2d 
870, 873–74 (3d Cir. 1982) (same). 
15  See Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1986) (telecast of baseball game was 
“fixed” as it was videotaped as it was broadcast). 
16 See John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Properties, Inc., 
322 F.3d 26, 31 & 35 n.4 (1st Cir. 2003) (upholding copyright in 
architectural drawings). 
17 If the speech is being recorded, on the other hand, fixation might 
occur. A good analogy for this is a radio broadcast. Without more–using 
some form of recording device–once the broadcast completes it is no 
longer possible to recapture the original broadcast. See 1 NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 2.03[B][2]. Consequently, it is not fixed. 
18 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “fixed”). 
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makes it clear that Congress intended to adopt the definition 
that the courts had developed under earlier versions of the 
copyright act.19  That  definition  requires  that   a   work   of 
authorship: 
 
be original to the author. Original, as the term 
is used in copyright, means only that the work 
was independently created by the author (as 
opposed to copied from other works), and that 
it possesses at least some minimal degree of 
creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of 
creativity is extremely low; even a slight 
amount will suffice. The vast majority of 
works make the grade quite easily, as they 
possess some creative spark, “no matter how 
crude, humble or obvious” it might be.20 
 
Thus, a work that is created by its author rather than copied 
and  one  that  has  some  creativity  within  it21  will  be 
copyrighted as soon as it is fixed.22 
                                            
19 See H. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976),  as  reprinted  in  1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664 (“The phrase ‘original works of authorship,’ 
which is purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate without 
change the standard of originality established by the courts under the 
present copyright statute.”). 
20 Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 
(1991). The definition in Feist carries over the definition that had been 
established in earlier cases, see, e.g., The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 
(1879); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), although 
it has placed a different emphasis on the amount of creativity needed. See 
Ralph D. Clifford, Random Numbers, Chaos Theory, and Cogitation: A 
Search for the Minimal Creativity Standard in Copyright Law, 82 
DENV.U. L. REV. 259, 262–70 (2004) [hereinafter “Clifford, Minimal 
Creativity Standard”]. See generally, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A]. 
21 There is split of authority among the circuits about how much 
creativity is sufficient, compare Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 
2003) (disallowing copyright in an artistic glass jellyfish sculpture) with 
Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing copyright 
in much simpler quilt design), and, for that matter, what creativity means. 
For a full discussion of this issue, see Clifford, Minimal Creativity 
Standard and Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the 
2008 Intellectual Property Rights 9 
  
When examined under these requirements, much, 
although not all, of the work-product of an attorney will 
qualify for copyright. A detailed consideration of the two 
requirements will differentiate between works that are 
protectable and those that are not. 
 
1.  Do Work-Product Documents 
                            Originate from the Attorney? 
 
This requisite is typically satisfied when most documents 
are created by an attorney. When the hypothetical attorneys 
being discussed in this article created the documents, they 
presumably decided on what words would best express the 
concepts with which they were working. Whether through 
keyboarding, dictation or longhand, these words were fixed 
as required by the Copyright Act. Although nothing more 
than this is required to satisfy this first requisite for 
copyrightability, some further analytical examination is 
necessary as some parts of the legal document may have been 
copied from another work. 
When Brenda wrote her brief in the Applejack case, for 
instance, it is probable that she extracted some parts of it 
from other attorneys or commercially available form books.23 
It is very typical, after all, for the pro forma sections of a 
brief to be reused in all of an attorney’s briefs.24 The original 
author of these sections may not be the primary author of the 
brief which would disallow any copyright claim25 or, even if 
                                                                                          
Creative Computer Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 
TUL. L.R. 1675 (1997). 
22 See JCW Investments, Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 914 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
23 Such compilations of legal forms are generally considered to be 
copyrightable, although the protection for any given form may not exist. 
See Ross, Brovins & Oehmke, P.C. v. Lexis Nexis Group, a Div. of Reed 
Elsevier Group, PLC, 463 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2006). 
24 When a brief supporting the grant of summary judgment is drafted, 
for example, the section of the brief that sets forth the standards used by 
the court in evaluating whether the case is appropriate for summary 
judgment is rarely custom-drafted; instead, the appropriate paragraphs are 
used out of the attorney’s or a commercially available form bank. 
25 The only possible claim would be as a “collective work,” see 17 
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the brief author wrote the pro forma sections, the copyright 
would be limited to a copyright in a derivative work which is 
limited to any newly added material that contains sufficient 
creativity to be considered original.26 
This analysis is likely to be more limiting to David’s 
ability to claim a copyright in his contract. Unlike briefs, 
contracts have more provisions that do not differ significantly 
from those found in any form book.27 Much of a contract, 
after all, is comprised of stock clauses28 that do not differ 
from contract to contract. Consequently, these prototype 
sections of a contract rarely owe their origin to the drafting 
attorney and would not be protected by a copyright.29 For the 
sections of the contract that are not drafted using the legal 
cookie cutter, on the other hand, and are custom drafted for 







                                                                                          
U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “collective work”), although that type of 
work is intended to be associated with such things as periodicals. As a 
practical matter, however, the courts are unlikely to see the brief as a 
compilation as there were no significant modifications made to the pro 
forma sections of the brief. As a compilation, it is only the selection and 
arrangement of the preexisting material that is protected. See 1 NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 3.02. As the content and order of these pro forma 
sections is always the same – a brief for summary judgment will set forth 
the standards for granting the motion first, if the standards are addressed 
at all – there is insufficient creativity to support the compilation copyright. 
See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 
340 (1991) (disallowing a copyright in the white pages of a phone book as 
insufficient creativity is demonstrated). 
    26 See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01. 
    27 See Donald v. Zack Meyer’s T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 
1029–30 (5th Cir. 1970) (finding attorney’s contract clauses “identical” to 
those found in published form books). 
    28 Examples of such a clause include merger, choice of law, arbitration 
and other similar clauses. 
    29 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 
U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991). 
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2.  Do Work-Product Documents  
                            Contain Sufficient Creativity? 
 
Unfortunately, determining whether a work has sufficient 
creativity to be copyrighted is not simple as the circuits have 
two different standards for how exceptional a work must be 
before a copyright subsists.30  In Feist, the Supreme Court 
described the needed amount of creativity as “minimal” and 
stressed that novelty was not required.31 Most circuits,32 the 
Second being a good example, seem to have focused on the 
word “minimal” and have not imposed strict standards for 
creativity.33 Other circuits,34 with the Ninth being the leading 
proponent, have ignored this warning and imposed potentially 
onerous  requirements  before  creativity  will  be  found.35 
Consequently, to determine if a work-product of an attorney 
is protected, the alternate circuit standards must be 
evaluated–the majority minimalist standard and the minority 
high novelty standard. 
                                            
30 Compare  Satava  v.  Lowry,  323  F.3d  805  (9th  Cir.  2003) 
(disallowing copyright in an artistic glass jellyfish sculpture) with Boisson 
v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing copyright in much 
simpler quilt design). See Clifford, Minimal Creativity Standard at 279–
80 (2004). 
31 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 
499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
32 See CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 97 F.3d 
1504 (1st Cir. 1996); Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 
2001); Masquerade Novelty, Inc., v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663 
(3d Cir. 1990); Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy 
Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 1996); Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. 
Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994), as modified 46 
F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995); Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC v. 
WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 
124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997); Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 
242 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
33 See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001). 
34 See J. Thomas Distributors, Inc., v. Greenline Distributors, Inc., 
100 F.3d 956 (6th Cir. 1996) (table, opinion at 1996 WL 636138); Stuart 
Entertainment, Inc. v. American Games, Inc., 205 F.3d 1347 (8th Cir. 
1999) (table, opinion at 1999 WL 1144831) (“we thus affirm on the basis 
of the district court’s memorandum and ruling without further 
discussion”); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003). 
35 See Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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(a)  The Creativity Required in a 
                             Minimalist Jurisdiction 
 
Most circuits have recognized how little creativity is 
needed to meet the Feist requirement. For example, the 
Second Circuit held that: 
 
Originality does not mean that the work for 
which copyright protection is sought must be 
either novel or unique, it simply means a work 
independently created by its author, one not 
copied from pre-existing works, and a work 
that comes from the exercise of the creative 
powers of the author’s mind, in other words, 
the fruits of the author’s intellectual labor.36 
 
As the court applied this definition of originality, its focus 
was on the intellectual choice-making in which the author 
engaged.37 For example, when the Boisson court examined 
the layout of the letters on the alphabet quilt design in 
question in the case, it determined that there was sufficient 
creativity in their layout because there was a wide range of 
possible layouts that could be used, only one of which was 
chosen by the author.38  As the court stated, “an author is 
entitled to copyright protection for an independently 
produced original work despite its identical nature to a prior 
work, because it is independent creation, and not novelty that 
is required.”39 
Under this standard of creativity, most of the work-
product produced by the hypothetical attorneys would be 
sufficiently creative for copyright protection to be available. 
There are obviously many words that can be chosen to 
express most legal concepts. By selecting from the choices, 
                                            
36 Boisson  v.  Banian,  Ltd.,  273  F.3d  262,  268  (2d Cir. 2001) 
(citations and quotation marks omitted). 
37 Cf. Clifford, Minimal Creativity Standards at 295–96. 
38 See Boisson, 273 F.3d at 269. 
39 Id. at 270. 
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sufficient creativity for copyright protection is found.40 The 
only expressions excluded in these jurisdictions would be 
those copied from another, pre-existing source41 or one where 
the author had no choices.42 
 
(b)  The Creativity Required in a  
                               High Novelty Jurisdiction 
 
Unfortunately, there is a minority of circuits that impose a 
significantly higher hurdle before they will find sufficient 
creativity.43  The  Ninth  Circuit  in  Satava  v.  Lowry,44  for 
example, demanded a great deal of novelty before a work will 
qualify for a copyright.45 In Satava, the court examined the 
copyrightability of a glass jellyfish sculpture.46 Despite the 
holding in Feist that novelty was not required,47 the Ninth 
Circuit nevertheless required it.48 
                                            
40 See id. See generally Clifford, Minimal Creativity Standards. 
41 Boisson, 273 F.3d at 270–71.  The  pro forma  sections  on  the 
standards for granting summary judgment, for example, may well be 
unprotectable if they are copied from a form book or other source. 
42 See id. at 271. Where there is no choice among expressions, a 
copyright lawyer would say that “merger” prevents a copyright from 
being claimed. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 
F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (“When the ‘idea’ and its ‘expression’ are 
thus inseparable, copying the ‘expression’ will not be barred, since 
protecting the ‘expression’ in such circumstances would confer a 
monopoly of the ‘idea’ upon the copyright owner free of the conditions 
and limitations imposed by the patent law.”). 
43 See Note 34, supra. 
44 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003). 
45 See id. at 810 (9th Cir. 2003) (“expressions that are standard, stock, 
or common to a particular subject matter or medium are not protectable 
under copyright law.”). Cf. id. at 812 (“These elements are so 
commonplace in glass-in-glass sculpture and so typical of jellyfish 
physiology that to recognize copyright protection in their combination 
effectively would give Satava a monopoly on lifelike glass-in-glass 
sculptures of single jellyfish with vertical tentacles.”). 
46 See id. at 807. 
47 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (“Originality does not signify novelty; a 
work may be original even though it closely resembles other works so 
long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.”). 
48 See Satava, 323 F.3d at 810 (copyright was rejected as sculpture 
was made of “standard, stock, or common” elements). 
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If novelty rather than expressive choice is required, 
significantly less of an attorney’s work-product will be 
protected by copyright. In Brenda’s brief, for example, a 
court would likely find that large sections of it are comprised 
of “expressions that are standard, stock or common to a 
particular  subject  matter.”49  As  before,  the  pro  forma 
sections on the standards for granting summary judgment 
would likely be unprotectable, 50  but unlike in minimalist 
circuits, significantly more may be excluded from copyright 
protection. In the discussion on the Rule Against Perpetuities 
or ERISA in Brenda’s brief, much of what Brenda said would 
be  “common  to  [those]  subject  matter[s].” 51   As  a 
consequence, no protection would be available. This impact 
is even more likely to affect the protection available to 
David’s contract as contracts are even more limited in the 
expression of their subject matter than briefs are. 
 
(c)  Where You Bring Suit Controls 
 
The inescapable conclusion of the analysis is that where 
you are (or, more accurately, where a suit for copyright 
infringement is commenced)52 is going to control what rights 
you have. In the high novelty circuits such as the Ninth, much 
of what an attorney produces is likely to be found creatively 
wanting and thus unprotectable. In most other circuits, the 
opposite result is likely. Until the Supreme Court decides to 
resolve the circuit split, 53  an attorney whose work is 
                                            
49 Id. (emphasis added). 
50 See note 41, supra. 
51 See Satava, 323 F.3d at 810. 
52 Personal jurisdiction in a copyright case is no different than most 
other actions and is based on Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.01[C]. Venue, on the other 
hand, has a specific statutory definition – a “district in which the 
defendant or his agent resides or may be found.” 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a) 
(2000). Determining where someone can be “found” is often less than 
simple. See generally 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.01[D]. 
 53 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Satava v. Lowry. 540 U.S. 
983 (2003). 
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appropriated can only hope that personal jurisdiction and 
venue exist in a district54 within a minimalist circuit. 
 
III.  COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP AND USE 
 
The Copyright Act vests ownership of a copyright in a 
work in the person or people who are the authors of it.55 “As 
a general rule, the author is the party who actually creates the 
work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, 
tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.”56 
Applying this rule to the practice of law establishes that 
the attorney is presumptively the author and will be 
recognized as the owner of the resulting copyright.57 There 
are three things that could alter this conclusion, however. 
First, in appropriate circumstances, the person who pays for a 
work to be produced may be considered the author under the 
“work-made-for-hire”  provision  of  the  Copyright  Act.58 
Second, for some works, someone in addition to the attorney 
may be able to claim ownership as a “joint work” under the 
                                            
54 Subject matter jurisdiction for a claim of copyright infringement is 
exclusively in the U.S. District Courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000). See 
generally 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.01[A]. 
55 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000). For the purpose of the analysis in 
this paper, it is assumed that the work-product in question was created on 
or after January 1, 1978, the effective date of the current Copyright Act. 
See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553 § 102, 90 Stat. 2541, 
2598–99 (1976). The ownership determination for works created before 
1978 is more complicated as the transitory sections of the 1976 Act must 
be evaluated. See generally, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.01[B]. 
56 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 
(1989). 
57 It is important to distinguish between the copyright – the set of 
rights established to the intangible work of authorship under the 
Copyright Act – and a copy of the copyrighted work–the physical 
embodiment of the intangible work of authorship. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 
(2000). Under most states’ laws, the copy belongs to the client. See Jones 
v. C.I.R., 129 T.C. 146, at 154–55 (2007) (citing cases). This article, on 
the other hand, addresses the broader question of the ownership and use of 
the copyright. 
58 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (establishing the employer as the 
owner of a work-made-for-hire work) & id. § 101 (defining “work made 
for hire”). 
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statute.59 Finally, the Code of Professional Conduct must be 
evaluated to determine if the rules of practice dictate a 
different answer.60 Each of these areas will be addressed in 
turn. 
 
A.  Are Work-Product Documents “Works 
                     Made for Hire” under the Copyright Act? 
 
Although normally the person who fixes an expression is 
its author under the Copyright Act, this rule is changed for a 
“work made for hire.”61 A work will be one made for hire if 
either: 
 
(1) [the] work [is] prepared by an 
employee within the scope of his or her 
employment; or 
(2) [the] work [is] specially ordered or 
commissioned for use as a contribution 
to a collective work, as a part of a 
motion picture or other audiovisual 
work, as a translation, as a 
supplementary work, as a compilation, 
as an instructional text, as a test, as 
answer material for a test, or as an atlas, 
if the parties expressly agree in a 
written instrument signed by them that 
the work shall be considered a work 
made for hire.62 
 
As a practical matter, attorney-prepared documents would 
have to qualify as having been created pursuant to 
employment as the second test—a specially ordered or 
commissioned work —does not often apply to the work of an 
attorney. Congress specified a list of nine categories of works 
                                            
59 See id. § 201(a) (establishing a co-ownership for jointly produced 
works) & id. § 101 (defining “joint work”). 
60 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2007), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/home.html [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. 
61 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000). 
62 Id. § 101. 
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that could be specially ordered or commissioned as a work 
made for hire: (1) collective works, (2) parts of audiovisual 
works, (3) translations, (4) supplementary works, (5) 
compilations, (6) instructional texts, (7) tests, (8) answers to 
tests, or (9) atlases.63 A work fixed by a non-employee that is 
not in these nine categories cannot be a work made for hire.64 
Most of these statutory examples—specifically number 
two, three, six, seven, eight and nine—do not describe the 
kinds of materials attorneys normally create. Consequently, if 
the specially ordered or commissioned category is to apply, 
the work must be a collective work, a supplementary work or 
a compilation. 
Very few works of lawyers qualify as a “collective work” 
which requires that “a number of contributions, constituting 
separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled 
into a collective whole.”65 The illustrative examples given in 
the definition are “periodical issue[s], antholog[ies and] 
encyclopedia[s].”66 In distinction, a lawyer’s work-product is 
a unified whole; indeed, even where multiple attorneys work 
on the same product, the individual contributions rarely stand 
on their own as articles in a magazine do. Once the work is 
done, a single work exists, not a collection of smaller pieces. 
Similarly the definition Congress provided for a 
supplementary work (found within the definition of a work 
made for hire) indicates that it must be a “secondary adjunct” 
to another author’s work such as a forward.67 This does not 
describe a contract, brief, or other typical work-product. 
Finally, a work-product is not usually a compilation as 
that requires the “assembl[y] of preexisting materials . . .”68 
Although there might be some pre-existing material 
contained within a work-product, most of the typical work-
                                            
63 Id. § 101 (2000) (defining “work made for hire”). 
64 See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 
738 (1989) (acknowledging that a sculpture could not be a specially 
ordered or commissioned work as it was not one of the nine categories). 
65 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining collective work). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. (defining “supplementary work” within the definition of “work 
made for hire”). 
68 Id. (defining “compilation”). 
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product is created specifically for the matter at hand. An 
exception to this would be a fill-in-the-blank type of form 
contract or other document where no drafting is done. If all 
the attorney does is to fill in the name, it could be a 
compilation under the statute. In this case, however, the other 
requirement of the statute for a specially ordered or 
commissioned work—that “the parties expressly agree in a 
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be 
considered a work made for hire” 69 —is rarely satisfied. 
Although many attorneys use written retainer agreements, 
they are unlikely to address the copyright ownership issue in 
a way that would vest ownership in the client.70 
Consequently, for an attorney’s work-product to belong to 
anyone other than the attorney, it will have to qualify as one 
produced during employment. To do this, the work had to be 
prepared by an employee as that term is understood under the 
common  law. 71   The  Court expressly  held  that  this 
determination is one of federal rather than state common 
law.72 In defining an employee, the Court relied heavily on 
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY.73 
The RESTATEMENT lists eight criteria that need to be 
evaluated to determine if someone is an employee (in a 
master-servant relationship under the RESTATEMENT): 
                                            
69 Id. (defining “work made for hire”). 
70 It is also important for a fill-in-the-blank document to evaluate 
whether there is sufficient creativity contained for it to be an original 
work of authorship at all. See infra § II.B.2. 
71 See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 
740–41 (1989). 
72 See id. at 740 (“Establishment of a federal rule of agency, rather 
than reliance on state agency law, is particularly appropriate here given 
the Act’s express objective of creating national, uniform copyright law by 
broadly preempting state statutory and common-law copyright 
regulation.”). 
73 See id. at 740, 751–52 and nn.18–31. It is unclear if the Court 
would similarly rely on the Third Restatement as its definition of an 
employee is much less specific. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 
7.07(3)(a) (2006). This imprecision is somewhat ameliorated by the 
comments to the section. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07, 
cmt. f. The comments in the Third Restatement seem to set forth a similar 
set of considerations as were found in the section in the Second. 
2008 Intellectual Property Rights 19 
  
 
(a) the extent of control which, by the 
agreement, the master may exercise over the 
details of the work; 
(b) whether or not the one employed is 
engaged in a distinct occupation or business; 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to 
whether, in the locality, the work is usually 
done under the direction of the employer or by 
a specialist without supervision; 
(d) the skill required in the particular 
occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman 
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the 
place of work for the person doing the work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is 
employed; 
(g) the method of payment, whether by the 
time or by the job; 
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the 
regular business of the employer; 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are 
creating the relation of master and servant; and 
(j) whether the principal is or is not in 
business.74 
 
While some attorneys can satisfy these criteria in relation to 
their client—in-house corporate counsel, for example—it is 
clear that most do not.75 It is the attorney, not the client, that 
controls  the  details  of  the  work.76  Attorneys  are  clearly 
                                            
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 220(2) (1958). 
75  The analysis here is of the relationship between the individual 
attorney and the client. Many attorneys who are in private practice are 
employees of their law firms. If this is true, the law firm would most 
likely be the owner of the copyright in the work-product rather than the 
individual attorney. 
76  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 220(2)(a). Cf. MODEL 
RULES, supra note 60, R. 1.2, cmts. [1] & [2] (2007) (“Clients normally 
defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the 
means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect 
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“engaged in a distinct occupation,” 77  work as a specialist 
without direct supervision,78 and require a high level of skill79 
to accomplish the client’s task. The next three factors also 
disfavor the private practice attorney being an employee as 
the work will most typically be done at the attorney’s office80 
and the relationship and payment will most typically be task-
oriented rather than salary81 (without an expectation that the 
attorney will be an employee of the client82). Generally, an 
attorney’s clients are not also lawyers.83 The final factor— 
whether the client is in business84—is the only one that is 
often true as many attorneys do represent businesses rather 
than individuals. It would seem unlikely that this factor, alone, 
is sufficient to alter the conclusion that attorneys are not, in 
general, employees of their clients. Consequently, the client 
cannot claim that the copyright belongs to the client under the 
work made for hire provision of the copyright act. 
     The consequence of this conclusion can be seen in the 
Smith hypothetical. Even if Onetime gave Howard the 
contract that had been drafted by David, that did not allow 
Howard to reuse it as it is David, not Onetime, that owns the 
copyright. The right to reproduce the contract, or make 
modifications to it, belongs to David.85 
 
B.  Are Work-Product Documents Joint Works 
      Under the Copyright Act? 
 
The Copyright Act recognizes that more that one person 
can collaborate to create an expressive work—a “joint work” 
                                                                                          
to technical, legal and tactical matters.”). 
    77 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 220(2)(b). 
    78 See id. § 220(2)(c). 
    79 See id. § 220(2)(d). 
    80 See id. § 220(2)(e).    
    81 See id. §§ 220(2)(f) & 220(2)(g). 
    82 See id. § 220(2)(i). 
    83 Cf. § 220(2)(h). 
    84 See id. § 220(2)(j). 
    85 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) & (3) (2000). Even though David has this 
basic right, the various copyright defenses must still be evaluated. See 
infra § IV. 
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under  the  statute.86  Such  works  belong  equally  to  both 
authors and either can control its use.87 As a claim could be 
made that the client and the attorney are joint authors of the 
attorney’s work-product,88 the standards for being a coauthor 
must be examined. These standards are not insignificant, 
however, and lead to the conclusion that work-products are 
not often the result of joint authorship. For a work to be a 
joint work under the Copyright Act, two requisites must be 
met: the purported joint authors must be authors under the 
copyright act and they must each intend to work together to 
prepare a joint work.89 
As discussed in section III.B above, to be an author, one 
has to fix a work of sufficient creativity to constitute a work 
of authorship. In the case of a joint work, each of the 
collaborators  must  do  this.90  This  is  rarely  true  for  an 
attorney’s work-product as the one who does the “fixing”—
and almost all of the creation of the expression—is the lawyer. 
At most, the client may contribute some or all of the ideas 
that underlie the document or may offer editing suggestions. 
Neither is sufficient to make the client an author.91 In the 
hypotheticals, it is unlikely that any of the clients participated 
in any meaningful way with their respective attorneys to 
produce the documents. 
                                            
86 See id. § 101 (“A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more 
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into 
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”). 
87 See id. § 201(a) (“The authors of a joint work are coowners of 
copyright in the work.”). See, e.g., Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 
F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Each author as co-owner has the right 
to use or to license the use of the work, subject to an accounting to the 
other co-owners for any profits.”). 
88 The author could not find a reported case where such a claim was 
made. The closest case may be Khandji v. Keystone Resorts Management, 
Inc., 140 F.R.D. 697 (D. Colo. 1992), where the court acknowledged that 
the attorney’s work-product was the appropriate subject of a copyright 
claim. See id. at 700. 
89 See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d at 1069. 
90 See id. at 1070–71 & the cases cited at 1070, n.8. 
91 See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding 
that an actress’s contribution of the research that was used to write a play 
and her suggestions about incidentals associated with the play were 
insufficient to make her a coauthor). 
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Similarly, it is unlikely that the necessary intent was 
present. For a joint work, all of the joint authors must 
individually  intend  to  produce  a  joint  work.92  In  the 
hypotheticals, such mutual intent seems to be lacking. 
Consequently, a work-product does not constitute a joint 
work. 
 
C.  Do the Ethics of Practice Dictate Who Owns 
                 the Work-Product or How It Can Be Used? 
 
Anyone who practices law knows that a primary 
consideration in all decision-making is the dictates of the 
rules  of  practice.93  These  rules—or  more  accurately,  the 
version of them adopted in the jurisdiction in which the 
attorney  is  practicing94—establish  the  framework  of  the 
attorney’s obligation to his or her client and society. Not 
surprisingly, the MODEL RULES address the issue of the rights 
to a work-product, but fail to provide any clear guidance 
about who owns the work-product of an attorney. The 
relevant rule as proposed by the ABA states: “Upon 
termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the 
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, 
such as . . . surrendering papers and property to which the 
client is entitled . . . The lawyer may retain papers relating to 
the client to the extent permitted by other law.”95 But is a 
                                            
92 See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d at 1068–69. 
93 See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 60. Almost every state has 
adopted some version of the MODEL RULES as their ethical code. See id. 
(listing dates of adoption), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha_states.html. 
94 Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 60, R. 1.16(d) (“The lawyer 
may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other 
law.”) with ARIZ. ETHICS RULES ER 1.16(d) (“The lawyer may retain 
documents reflecting work performed for the client to the extent permitted 
by other law only if retaining them would not prejudice the client's 
rights.”). An even greater difference is found in the Massachusetts version 
of the rule where the final sentence in Rule 1.16(d) has been omitted and a 
new subsection (e) has been added. See MASS. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.16, available at http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/rpc1.htm 
(2003). 
95 MODEL RULES, supra note 60, R. 1.16(d). 
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client “entitled” to the attorney’s work-product or do “other 
law[s]” allow the attorney to maintain it? Equally, are the 
rules of practice addressing ownership of copyright rights or 
are they just addressing the possession and use of a copy?96 
 
1.  The Rules of Practice Cannot Transfer 
Ownership of the Copyright to the Client 
 
The Copyright Act vests initial ownership of the 
copyright in the author. 97  As discussed above, unless the 
lawyer is a common law employee of the client, this means 
that lawyer is the initial copyright owner. Consequently, 
absent an express written agreement to the contrary,98  the 
client does not own the copyright and cannot, therefore, use 
ownership as the basis for a claim of entitlement under the 
rules of practice. Further, the rules of practice of a state 
cannot alter this rule and establish that the client owns the 
copyright because of the limitation on the involuntary transfer 
of a copyright that is contained within the Act: 
 
When an individual author's ownership of a 
copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights 
under a copyright, has not previously been 
transferred voluntarily by that individual 
author, no action by any governmental body or 
other official or organization purporting to 
seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights 
of ownership with respect to the copyright, or 
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, 
                                            
96 The Copyright Act expressly distinguishes between the “copyright” 
and a “copy.” See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000). The copyright is associated 
with the rights established by the Act to do such things as reproduce the 
work while the copy is associated with a physical, material object on 
which the work is recorded. See, e.g., U.S. v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 239–
40 (5th Cir. 1982). 
97 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000). 
98 See id.  §§ 204(a)  &  101  (defining  “transfer  of  copyright 
ownership”). Any transfer of the ownership of a copyright, whether by 
assignment, mortgage or exclusive license, requires a written and signed 
document. See id. § 204(a). 
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shall be given effect under this title, except as 
provided under title 11.99 
 
Consequently, any rule contained in a state’s Code of 
Professional Conduct that purports to transfer an attorney’s 
copyright would be preempted.100 
 
2.  The Rules of Practice May Be Able to Provide the 
Client with Limited Rights to Use the Work Product 
 
The limitation against a state mandated transfer of the 
copyright does not apply, however, if all that it seeks to 
transfer is a nonexclusive right to use the copyrighted work as 
                                            
99 Id. § 201(e). The reference to title 11 is a reference to a Bankruptcy 
Court’s power to seize a copyright as an asset of a bankrupt. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541 (2000). 
Even without this limitation expressed in the Act, it is highly 
unlikely that state adopted rules of practice could designate the client as 
the owner of the copyright in an attorney’s work-product as such a rule 
would likely be preempted under the Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), decision. In Bonito Boats, the Supreme 
Court established that a state rule that “regulate the use of . . . intellectual 
property in any manner . . . inconsistent with federal law” would be 
preempted. Id. at 156 (quoting Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 
U.S. 257, 262 (1979)). The Copyright Act designates the actual author of 
the work as the owner of the rights, based on a carefully crafted 
congressional compromise. See. H.R. Rep. 94-1476, at 121, as reprinted 
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 (“The work-made-for-hire provisions 
of this bill represent a carefully balanced compromise . . .”). A state is not 
allowed to alter the legislatively established balance. Consequently, the 
attorney, not the client, owns the copyright. 
See generally, Ralph D. Clifford, The Federal Circuit’s Cruise to 
Uncharted Waters: How Patent Protection for Algorithms and Business 
Methods May Sink the UCITA and State Intellectual Property Protection, 
73 TEMP. L. REV. 1241 (2000). 
100 See H.R. Rep. No.  94-1476, at 123 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5739 (“The purpose of [17 U.S.C. § 201(e)] is to 
reaffirm the basic principle that the United States copyright of an 
individual author shall be secured to that author, and cannot be taken 
away by any involuntary transfer.”). Cf. Advance Magazine Publishers, 
Inc. v. Leach, 466 F.Supp. 2d 628, 635–36 (D. Md. 2006) (holding that 
state adverse possession law has been preempted by the Copyright Act 
and cannot be deemed to be a transfer by “operation of law”). 
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Section 201(e) only applies to transfers of ownership.101 The 
definition of “transfer of copyright ownership” in Section 101 
of the act expressly excludes “a nonexclusive license.” 102 
Because nonexclusive rights to use a copyrighted work are 
not transfers under the Act, involuntary transfers of 
nonexclusive rights can be mandated; indeed, copyright law 
has developed a judicial doctrine known as an implied license 
that does exactly that. 
The implied license doctrine has been expressly accepted 
in  most  circuits.103  As  the  rule  has  been  set  forth  by  the 
Seventh Circuit: 
 
an implied nonexclusive license has been 
granted when (1) a person (the licensee) 
requests the creation of a work, (2) the creator 
(the licensor) makes that particular work and 
delivers it to the licensee who requested it, and 
(3) the licensor intends that the 
licensee-requestor copy and distribute his 
work.104  
 
The three requirements of this rule are probably met by 
an attorney’s work-product—it is developed for the client,105 
is copied and distributed either to or on behalf of the client, 
                                            
101 See, e.g., John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., 
Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 40 (1st Cir. 2003). 
102  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)  (defining  “transfer  of  copyright 
ownership”). 
103 See John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc. 322 
F.3d 26, 40 (1st Cir. 2003); Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 
1998); Lowe v. Loud Records, 126 F. App’x. 545, 547 (3d Cir. 2005) (not 
precedential); Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 
505, 514 (4th Cir. 2002); Lulirama Ltd., Inc. v. Axcess Broad. Serv., Inc., 
128 F.3d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 1997); I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 
775 (7th Cir. 1996); Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th 
Cir. 1990); Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 991–92 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
104 I.A.E., Inc., 74 F.3d at 776. This statement of the law is consistent 
with the rule adopted by most circuits. See cases cited in note 103, supra. 
105  Even though the client probably does not request the specific 
document to be created, i.e., a brief supporting summary judgment, the 
client does request the representation which, in turn, leads to the 
development of the necessary documents. 
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prohibited the client from doing so.111 Although no reported 
case could be found that so held, a similar implied license to 
continue using an attorney’s work-product as that work was 
originally intended would be a probable conclusion were the 
matter to be litigated. It is fair to assume, therefore, that once 
the document has been produced, the client has the right to 
use it. Consequently, in the apropos Henry King hypothetical, 
any document Henry completed must be made available to 
Welbuilt so that it can use it as the parties originally intended. 
This would be true even if Henry has not been fully 
compensated as Welbuilt’s nonexclusive license to use the 
documents will not be abrogated for non-payment as that is 
not generally seen as terminating the license.112 
 
(b)  Modifying or Reusing the Work-Product 
 
If the work-product is used exactly as intended and is not 
modified by either the client or the client’s replacement 
counsel, the implied license doctrine would almost certainly 
prevent the use from being considered infringing. The 
situation becomes much more complicated, however, if the 
original work is modified (which would include completing a 
draft document) or if it is used in a way that is different than 
what was originally intended. 
In Oddo v. Ries,113 for example, an author was deemed to 
have created an implied license when he submitted an article 
to a partnership he had formed with the defendant for 
ultimate publication as part of a book.114 Subsequently, being 
dissatisfied with the plaintiff Oddo’s efforts, the defendant 
Ries hired another writer who finished the book which 
included modifying the material that Oddo had submitted.115 
Ries then published the book.116 The court held that this was 
                                            
111 See id. 
112 Cf. Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding 
obligation to pay royalties a covenant not a condition thus not constituting 
a material breach). 
113 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984). 
114 See id. at 634. 
115 See id. at 632. 
116 See id. 
28 Trends and Issues in Intellectual Property Vol. 3 
 
improper, stating that “the implied license to use the articles 
in the manuscript does not give [the defendant] the right to 
use the articles in any work other than the manuscript 
itself.”117 In other words, the implied license gave the right to 
use the work as submitted, but did not allow changes to be 
made to the submitted work. 
If the Oddo rule could simply be applied to the use of an 
attorney’s work-product, the analysis would not be difficult—
no changes can be made. For example, if the original attorney 
wrote a memorandum in support of summary judgment, 
under Oddo, it would be improper for a later counsel to 
modify the memorandum into a memorandum addressing 
judgment as a matter of law and would certainly be improper 
to use it to develop an appellate brief. Similarly, if the 
attorney drafts a contract for one agreement, it would be 
improper for the client to modify it for another. Unfortunately, 
things in copyright law are rarely that simple.118  
To begin with, complexity is introduced by the problem 
of determining what the actual terms of the nonexclusive 
license are as the typical attorney and client will not have 
expressed any agreement concerning each party’s respective 
intellectual  property rights.119  From  the  perspective  of  the 
copyright law, a licensee (client) only obtains the specific 
copyright rights that the licensor (attorney) intended to 
transfer. 120  Where no intent is expressed—in words or in 
conduct—no rights transfer, effectively requiring implied 
licenses to be narrowly construed. From the perspective of 
the rules of practice, however, the licensor (attorney) is under 
                                            
117 Id. at 634. 
118 In addition to the complexity suggested by the implied terms to 
the nonexclusive license being discussed in this section, the consequences 
of the fair use defense, discussed in section IV below, must also be 
evaluated. 
119 Most times, the nonexclusive rights are created by implication 
based on the parties’ conduct rather than on their words. See Lulirama 
Ltd., Inc. v. Axcess Broadcast Services, Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 
1997) (“When the totality of the parties' conduct indicates an intent to 
grant . . . permission [to use a copyrighted work], the result is a legal 
nonexclusive license. . ..” (quotation marks omitted)). 
120 See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 
14, 20 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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an affirmative obligation to “take steps to the extent 
reasonably practicable to protect a client's  interests . . .”121 
This could easily cause a court to broadly construe the 
implied license. 
The considerations that might lead a court to broadly 
construe the license are re-enforced further by the “Implied 
Grant of Collateral Rights” doctrine.122 The doctrine requires 
a license to be interpreted broadly enough that its purpose can 
be  achieved.123  For example,  the  doctrine  would  give  a 
licensee the right to distribute records that were made 
pursuant to a license to record them even where the original 
license was silent about distribution.124 
When the collateral rights doctrine is considered together 
with the rules of practice, it is likely that a court would make 
a broad interpretation of the nonexclusive license. 
Consequently, at a minimum, the license likely includes the 
right for the client to complete the document being prepared 
so that it can be used as intended. After all, the rules of 
practice express a strong preference in favor of the client’s 
continued use of the work-product material; indeed, it would 
not be surprising if a court deemed the rules as part of the 
implied contract between the attorney and client. Beyond 
merely completing the document, because the basic 
relationship between the attorney and client calls for the 
attorney to represent the client in a particular matter, the 
collateral rights grant would seem to cover additional uses of 
the work-product within the same matter.125 
                                            
121 MODEL RULES, supra note 60, R. 1.16(d). See id. cmt. 9 (“Even if 
the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take 
all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client.”). 
122 See Werbungs Und Commerz Union Austalt v. Collectors Guild, 
Ltd., 728 F.Supp. 975, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The term “Implied Grant of 
Collateral Rights” appears to owe its origin to Professor Nimmer as 
presented in  NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10[C]. 
123 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10[C]. 
124 Cf. Royal v. Radio Corp. of America, No. Civ. 65-391, 1955 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 4195, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1955). 
125 Of course, if the relationship between the attorney and client does 
not match the typical ones being discussed in this article, the results of the 
analysis would differ. If, for example, the attorney is hired only to write a 
particular document, rather than engage in a generalized representation of 
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As a consequence, the most probable outcome is that the 
client will be able to use the work-product throughout the 
conclusion of the matter for which the attorney was originally 
hired. This, of course, assumes that the attorney doesn’t 
terminate the license, if he or she has that right. This requires 
an exploration of when licenses can be terminated. 
 
 
(c)  Terminating an Implied License 
 
The final factor that can complicate the analysis of the 
effect of an implied license on an attorney’s work-product is 
whether the license is terminable. Under copyright law, a 
license that is not supported by consideration from the 
licensee (client) is revocable.126  
Obviously, therefore, if the attorney has been fully 
compensated for developing the work-product, the implied 
license could not be terminated, leaving the client free to use 
it in accordance with the implied terms of the license. Where 
compensation has not been paid, as at-will employment does 
not constitute consideration,127 and an attorney’s employment 
by  a  client  is  at  will  by  the  rules  of  practice,128  the 
nonexclusive license granted to the client to use the 
attorney’s work-product would be revocable. 
                                                                                          
the client, the client’s argument for a broad license is weaker. An example 
of this would be where the lawyer directly representing the client hires 
another attorney to write a memorandum of law. 
126 See Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 574 n.12 (4th Cir. 
1994); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.02[B][5]. 
127 See Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 452 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that “[c]onsideration for a promise, by either the employee or the 
employer in an at-will employment, cannot be dependent on a period of 
continued employment. Such a promise would be illusory because it fails 
to bind the promisor who always retains the option of discontinuing 
employment in lieu of performance.”). See generally 17B C.J.S. 
Contracts § 441 (1999) (“Contracts of employment, whose only 
consideration is the services to be performed thereunder and which are 
silent as to duration, are terminable at will . . .”). 
128 See MODEL RULES, supra note 60, R. 1.16(a)(3) & id. cmt. 4 (“A 
client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without 
cause . . .”). 
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Where a license is revocable, the procedure the licensor 
(attorney) uses to terminate it is defined by state contract 
law.129 This will generally empower the licensor to terminate 
it at will, although some states have begun to require a 
reasonable amount of notice to be provided before 
termination.130 
The ability of an attorney to terminate the nonexclusive 
license will differ depending on the contract law of the 
jurisdiction. If the state follows the more traditional rule that 
allows termination with minimal notice, the attorney could 
inform the client of the revocation which would then require 
the client to stop using the work-product immediately. If, on 
the other hand, as is much more probable, the state requires 
reasonable notice to terminate,131 the client would maintain 
the right to continue using the work-product for at least some 
time, presumably the amount of time that it would take the 
client to replace it with a new one. In either case, though, the 
client’s ability to continue using the work-product as a source 
                                            
129 See Walthal v. Rusk, 172 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1999); Korman v. 
HBC Florida, Inc., 182 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 1999); Invessys, Inc. v. 
McGraw-Hill Companies, Ltd., 369 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2004); NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 11.10[B]. But see Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 
585 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that federal law–17 U.S.C. § 203–controls 
the termination of copyright licenses). But cf. Quinn v. City of Detroit, 23 
F.Supp.2d 741 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that the City was entitled to a 
reasonable period of time after notice before the license could be revoked 
without doing an Erie analysis). 
Although state law controls the termination of a license in most 
circuits, the Copyright Act also provides an absolute right to terminate a 
license, generally after thirty-five years. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2000). 
As a practical matter, however, for an attorney’s work-product, the value 
is likely to be absent after that long of a period. If a work-product license 
is terminated, therefore, it is likely to be under the provisions of state law. 
130 See, e.g., 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 439 (1999) (“If there is nothing 
in the nature or the language of a contract for an indefinite period to 
indicate that it is perpetual, the courts will interpret the contract to be 
terminable at will . .  . Some courts require, however, that such contracts 
be terminated only on reasonable notice.”). 
131 For the license between an attorney and client, it is likely that 
states would adopt this reasonable notice requirement because of the 
dictates contained within the rules of practice that an attorney take 
reasonable steps to protect the client when the employment relationship 
terminates. See MODEL RULES, supra note 60, R. 1.16(d). 
32 Trends and Issues in Intellectual Property Vol. 3 
 
for newly developed ones—transforming a summary 
judgment memorandum into an appellate brief, for 
example132—would be terminated. 
When applied to the hypotheticals, only Henry King 
would have a right to terminate the nonexclusive license. In 
both the Brenda Maxim and David Smith hypotheticals, the 
attorneys were compensated, making the license irrevocable. 
Their clients, therefore, have a continuing right to use the 
works, only limited as discussed in the two proceeding 
subsections. Henry King, on the other hand, would have to do 
a work-product by work-product analysis to determine if he 
could terminate the nonexclusive license. If, for example, the 
work-product in question could not practically be replaced—
an executed contract or time-critical court document, for 
example—the client would maintain a right to use them. But 
where the document can be replaced, Henry’s termination 
would be effective and the client’s right to use the document 
would cease. 
 
IV.  THE COPYRIGHT DEFENSE OF FAIR USE 
 
The analysis of copyright rights is never complete without 
examining the “fair use” defense.133 Fair use constitutes an 
affirmative  defense  to  a  copyright  infringement  claim.134 
Unfortunately, an easy comprehension of the defense is 
                                            
132  Again, here, it is important to remember the distinction that 
copyright law makes between the idea and the expression of it that 
comprise a work of authorship. See Section II, supra. The client, 
replacement counsel, or anyone else, for that matter, are free to examine 
the work-product and extract from it the ideas that underlie it. Thus, for 
example, the new attorney could use the original document as a source for 
the relevant cases and statutes that apply to the client’s matter. Similarly, 
the legal theory under which the original counsel developed the case 
could be used without worries about copyright infringement. What is 
protected by copyright is how the original attorney expressed the legal 
theory, not the theory itself. 
133 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
134  See id. § 106 (“Subject to sections 107 . . . , the owner of 
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize 
any of the following . . .”). 
2008 Intellectual Property Rights 33 
  
unlikely as it is both open-ended and imprecise.135 The statute 
dictates that four specific factors “shall [be] include[d]” in the 
evaluation,136  but  the  definition  of  “includ[e]”  that  is 
contained within the statute indicates these four factors are 
“illustrative and not limitative.”137 Consequently, although an 
analysis of the four statutory factors must always be done, 
there is nothing to stop a court from defining and applying 
some new fifth rule.138 
Unfortunately, the four primary considerations are not 
exercises in elucidative legislative drafting.139 According to 
the Copyright Act, fair use is found based primarily on: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.140 
Each of these statutory factors will be examined next, 
followed by a discussion of whether the courts are likely to 
                                            
135 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679. 
136 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
137 Id. § 101 (defining “including”). Normal statutory interpretation 
reaches the opposite result and limits the general term to those items 
specified in the list. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:17 (7th ed. 2007) 
138 Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) 
(“[T]ransformative works . . .  lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's 
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright  . . .). 
139 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679 (“no real definition of the concept [of fair use] 
has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, 
no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the 
question must be decided on its own facts.”). 
140 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
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find a fifth factor outside of the statutory framework when 
examining work-products. After this discussion, they will be 
applied collectively to the hypothetical work-product 
documents. 
 
A.   Purpose and Character of the Use of the 
Work-Product 
 
This “purpose of the use” statutory factor evaluates how 
the  copyrighted  work  was  used  by  the  appropriator.141  In 
effect, it evaluates whether there is a high enough societal 
gain achieved by the appropriation that requiring the author 
to forego his or her normal compensation is appropriate. 
Three types of uses are apropos to work-products: 
 
1.  Advancing the Public Interest 
The statute specifies that uses “for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research 
[are] not an infringement of copyright.”142 A work-product 
document being used in litigation would seem to at least 
touch on the sort of purpose that Congress indicated is more 
likely to be fair use. As with the categories expressly stated, 
litigation advances democracy, a core value to be preserved 
by appropriate application of the fair use defense as 
imprecisely described as “criticism, comment, [and] news 
reporting” in the statute.143 
                                            
141 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000). 
142  Id. § 107 (emphasis added). Although this sentence from the 
statute makes it appear as if these types of uses are absolutely allowed, the 
next sentence makes it clear that all of the factors must be examined, see 
id.; indeed, these uses have been used by the courts to clarify the first of 
the statutory factors contained in Section 107(1). See Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (“[T]he 
examples enumerated in § 107 . . . give some idea of the sort of activities 
the courts might regard as fair use under the circumstances.” (quotation 
marks and citation omitted)). 
    143 See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of America v. Handgun Control Fed’n of Ohio, 
15 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The scope of the fair use doctrine is 
wider when the use relates to issues of public concern.”); Sega Enters. Ltd. 
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2.  Creating a Transformative Work 
A highly determinative factor in evaluating the purpose of 
the use is whether the copying and use of the original work 
resulted in a new work that: 
adds something new, with a further purpose or 
different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message; ... in other 
words, whether and to what extent the new 
work is “transformative.” . . . [T]he more 
transformative the new work, the less will be 
the significance of other factors, like 
commercialism, that may weigh against a 
finding of fair use.144 
In other words, the “copyrightable expression in the original 
work [must be] used as raw material, transformed in the 
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and 
understandings . . .”145   The closer the copy is to the original 
expression, the less likely it is to be fair use. 
 
3.  Using a Work Non-Commercially 
A commercial use of another’s copyrighted work raises a 
rebuttable presumption that the use is not fair.146 “The crux of 
the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive 
of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to 
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without 
paying  the customary price.”147  As  with  all  other  fair  use 
                                                                                          
v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Public benefit 
need not be direct or tangible, but may arise because the challenged use 
serves a public interest.”). Cf. Pac. & S. Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 
1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Where strict enforcement of the rights of a 
copyright holder . . . would conflict with . . . some other important 
societal value, courts should be free to fashion an appropriate fair use 
exemption.”). 
    144 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
    145 Castle Rock Entm’t. v. Carol Publ’g. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 
(2d Cir. 1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
    146 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.,471 U.S. at 562. 
    147 Id. 
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factors, however, the presumption of unfair use can be 
overcome where the other fair use considerations outweigh 
the commercial nature of the use.148 
 
B.  Nature of the Work-Product 
The “nature of the work” statutory factor requires 
consideration  of  the kind of work  that  was  copied.149  Two 
relevant aspects of work-products merit discussion: 
 
1.  Work Within Core of Copyright 
The essence of this factor addresses whether the 
copyrighted work is considered within the “core” of works 
that obtain copyright protection.150 The Supreme Court has 
indicated that “some works are closer to the core of intended 
copyright protection than others, with the consequence that 
fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works 
are copied.”151 
The works that are at the core of copyright are those that 
required the most creativity in their creation or were 
generated  in  an  expectation  of  returning  a  profit.152 
Consequently, works of fiction are less likely to support a 
finding of fair use that works of non-fiction153 as are works 





                                            
    148 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994). 
    149 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000). 
    150 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
    151 Id. 
    152 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992). 
    153 See id. 
    154 See id. A copyrighted novel returns a reward to the author because 
people are interested in obtaining and reading the novel itself. This differs 
from a work-product as it is rarely of intrinsic value; instead, the value 
comes from its ability to achieve a particular legal result. 
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2.  Unpublished Work 
Another relevant consideration in evaluating the nature of 
the work is whether it is published.155 When a work has not 
been published, a finding of fair use is much less likely.156 
“Publication” is a term-of-art within copyright law. As 
the statute defines it, “‘[p]ublication’ is the distribution of 
copies . . . of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”157 Very few work-
products meet this statutory definition. 
 
C.  Amount of the Work-Product Used 
 
The “amount copied” statutory factor evaluates the 
quantity of the copyrighted work that is used in the new 
work.158  “As  a  general  matter,  as  the  amount  of  the 
copyrighted material that is used increases, the likelihood that 
the use will constitute a ‘fair use’ decreases.” 159  It is 
important to recognize, however, that there are no 
absolutes—copying all of an expression might be fair,160 just 
as copying a small, but fundamental part of the expression 
might  not  be.161  Consequently,  both  the  quantity  and  the 
quality of what is copied must be evaluated. 
 
D.   Effect of Work-Product Copying on the 
Marketplace 
 
The final “effect of copying” factor evaluates the impact 
that the type of copying done would have on the copyright 
                                            
    155 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
554 (1985). 
    156 See id. 
    157 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “publication”). 
    158 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000). 
    159 Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003). 
    160 See Sundeman v. Seajay Society, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 205 (4th Cir. 
1998). 
    161 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
564–65 (1985). 
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owner’s overall market for the work.162 This factor is, without 
doubt, the most important of the four statutory factors.163 At 
the extreme, copying that destroys an author’s ability to 
obtain reasonable value for the work is unfair. 
As this analysis is done, it is necessary to have an 
appropriately broad perspective. As the Supreme Court held: 
 
It requires courts to consider not only the 
extent of market harm caused by the particular 
actions of the alleged infringer, but also 
whether unrestricted and widespread conduct 
of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . 
would result in a substantially adverse impact 
on the potential market for the original. The 
enquiry must take account not only of harm to 
the original but also of harm to the market for 
derivative works.164 
 
In other words, the analysis requires that an assumption is 
made that all other people who are similarly situated with the 
appropriator—other attorneys, for the purpose of this paper—
are also copying the work in a similar way. It is the overall 
consequence this copying causes that forms the basis for the 
effect of copying factor analysis. 
Additionally, Congress required two evaluations of the 
effects, one on “the potential market for” the copyrighted 
work and the other on the “value of” it.165  Consequently, 
while the analysis must determine the economic impact on 
the copyright owner, it must also determine the other, non-
economic consequences of the copying.166 An example of this 
can be found in Weissmann v. Freeman.167 In the case, the 
defendant copied some of the plaintiff’s academic work.168 
                                            
162 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000). 
163 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. 
164 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). 
165 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000). 
166 See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 
F.3d 191, 202 (3d Cir. 2003). 
167 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989). 
168 See id. at 1326. 
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The court determined that the effect of copying factor did not 
favor a fair use finding despite the lack of economic impacts 
as the appropriation would “create[] a distinct disincentive for 
[the plaintiff] to continue to research and publish in the field 
of nuclear medicine” 169  The district court was expressly 
criticized for focusing on the “dollars received, rather than 
upon the realities of promotion and tenure in an academic 
setting.”170 
 
E.  The Fifth Factor—Legal System 
Considerations 
 
As discussed above, the four statutory factors are not 
exclusive and the courts can examine any other consideration 
that is relevant to determining whether the appropriation was 
fair.171 When examining fair use in the context of a work-
product document, a probable fifth factor exists: the needs of 
the legal system itself. While, to a certain extent, the “public 
interest” aspect of the purpose of the use factor addresses 
similar considerations, the fact that an attorney’s work is so 
central to the administration of justice magnifies the 
importance of the work to society, with a correspondingly 
higher probability of a fair use finding. The fair use defense, 
after all, has an important purpose of limiting an author’s 
copyright rights when this is necessary to advance 
democracy.172  Work-product  documents,  particularly  those 
that are used within the judicial system, have this 
consequence.173  Without  the  pleadings,  briefs,  and  other 




                                            
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 See discussion in the beginning of Section IV, supra; Haberman v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F.Supp. 201, 214 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding 
that appropriator’s good faith is relevant to a fair use analysis). 
172 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
173 Cf., e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 145–46 
(1994). 
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F.  Application to the Fair Use Hypotheticals 
In this final part of the section, the fair use defense will be 
applied to the copying that occurred in the two relevant 
hypotheticals. This is necessary as a fair use analysis requires 
a case-by-case application of the facts to the law.174 Thus, the 
Brenda Maxim hypothetical will be considered first and the 
David Smith hypothetical will follow. The third hypothetical 
involving Henry King will not be discussed in this section as 
it involves issues of implied licenses rather than fair use.175 
 
1.  Brenda Maxim Hypothetical— 
Litigation Work-Products 
 
The Brenda Maxim hypothetical shows copying by three 
separate appropriators: the court, the attorney in the second 
case, and the research system. Each will be discussed in turn. 
 
(a)  Court Copying of Her Expression 
 
The court’s use of Brenda’s expression, even without 
attribution, is likely to be considered fair use. The analysis: 
 
(1)  Purpose of the Use 
This factor largely favors fair use. First, the judge’s use of 
Brenda’s expression was not commercial. Neither the judge 
nor the legal system receive compensation because of the 
unattributed quote. Second, the purposes of the quote serves 
to advance the public interest as definitions of the law in 
court opinions are critical to democracy in a common law 
country and they further serve the educational function of 
explaining the law. Slightly contradicting a fair use finding, 
on the other hand, is that the quote is not a transformative use 
of Brenda’s work-product as the court opinion would closely 
match the brief. Overall, the first two positive considerations, 
                                            
174 See, e.g., Arica Institute, Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1077 (2d 
Cir. 1992). 
175 For a discussion of this hypothetical, see Section III.C.2.c, supra. 
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particularly the public interest served, seem to outweigh the 
one negative, however. This factor favors fair use, therefore. 
 
(2)  Nature of the Work 
The nature of the work factor, too, generally favors fair 
use. As a work of non-fiction, a fair use finding is more likely 
established  than  it  would  be  for  a  fictional  one.176  This 
finding is made even more probable by the law being the 
subject matter of the brief. On the other hand, the work is not 
a published work, at least as that term is defined in the 
Copyright Act.177 An unpublished work is significantly less 
likely to support a fair use finding.178 
In balancing these contradictory considerations, there are 
two reasons why the balance is likely to tip in favor of fair 
use. First, there is a significant chance that the courts would 
not use the statutory definition of publication for a fair use 
analysis as the work’s distribution out of the control of the 
author seems more apropos to fair use analysis than the 
traditional  copyright  publication  analysis.179  Second,  even 
though the work was not “published,” it was distributed by 
the author into a forum that maintains public records. Both of 
these increase the probability that this factor favors fair use. 
 
                                            
    176 See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 
F.3d 191, 200 (3d Cir. 2003). 
    177 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)  (defining  “publication”  as  “the 
distribution of copies .  .  . of a work to the public by sale or other transfer 
of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”). 
    178 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
554 (1985). 
    179 Cf. American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740, 743 (2d Cir. 
1956). 
Historically, publication was the time when federal copyright 
protection became operative. See Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. 
CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 1999). This changed with the 
adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act. See note 11, supra with 
accompanying text. For a brief discussion of the history of “publication” 
under the Copyright Acts, see generally RayMing Chang, “Publication" 
Does Not Really Mean Publication: the Need to Amend the Definition of 
Publication in the Copyright Act, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 225, 226–31 (2005). 
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(3)  Amount Copied 
 
Of the four statutory factors, this is the one that leans 
most strongly against a fair use finding. The most significant 
portion of the brief was the sections that defined both the 
Rule Against Perpetuities and ERISA and clarified their 
interrelationship. Copying the core of the brief disfavors a 
fair use finding.180 
 
(4) Effect of Copying on Brenda’s Market 
 
The court’s use of the quote is unlikely to have a 
significant effect on Brenda’s marketplace for her brief. First, 
there is no real economic market for briefs after their use in 
the case for which they were written. Although a submitted 
brief may sometimes be used in academia to study the subject 
briefed,181 monetary compensation is not paid. Consequently, 
even if every judge quoted attorney’s briefs without 
permission, there would be no economic impact on the 
attorney. 
Although there is a slightly higher impact on the non-
monetary reward the attorney would receive—presumably the 
enhanced reputation an attorney would develop by having a 
judge publicly acknowledge the attorney’s abilities by using 
an approved quotation written by the attorney—the injury 
does not stem from copyright rights but from the court’s 
failure to attribute the quote to the attorney. This right of 
attribution, however, is not protected by the Copyright Act.182 
                                            
180 See Sundeman v. Seajay Society, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 205–06 (4th 
Cir. 1998); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003). 
181 See    http://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~i385tpd/385tpage.html,     at 
class 6 (last visited March 31, 2008) (assigning the author’s amicus brief 
to a class). 
182  The Copyright Act only establishes a right of attribution for 
“work[s] of visual art.” 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (2000) (protecting an 
artist’s right to maintain his or her name on a work of visual art). A “work 
of visual art” is “a painting, drawing, print, . . . sculpture, [or] still 
photographic image . . .” Id. § 101. A brief is none of these. See also 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) 
(holding that a failure to attribute a public domain work to its author does 
not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)). 
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Additionally, although Brenda was not given credit for the 
quote itself, she would be listed as counsel of record, thus 
giving her much of the credit for the case. 
Both the monetary and non-monetary analysis reach the 
same result: There is no significant impact on Brenda’s 
market. This most important factor also favors fair use, 
therefore. 
 
(5)  The Fifth Factor— Legal System Considerations 
 
The probable fifth factor also strongly favors fair use. 
Brenda’s brief was developed with the primary purpose of 
influencing a judge to render a favorable decision. This, of 
course, is how our common law system develops the law.183 
Disallowing a judge to quote from a brief without the 
permission of the brief’s author would seem to serve as a 
major impediment in the functioning of the legal system. 
Consequently, courts are much more likely to consider brief 
copying to be fair use. 
 
(6)  Conclusion 
 
Three of the four statutory factors favor a finding of fair 
use as do the extra-statutory considerations. It is probable, 
therefore, that a court would find that the judge’s appropria-
tion of Brenda’s work-product was fair and, consequently, 
not a violation of the Copyright Act.184 
 
(b)  Other Attorneys Copying Her Expression 
 
The other attorney appropriating Brenda’s expression 
without permission is less likely to be a fair use. The analysis: 
 
                                            
    183 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 17–
20 (1973). See generally, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 
(1881). 
    184 Although judicial plagiarism is not prevented by the Copyright Act, 
it is not suggested that this conduct is appropriate.  See ABA MODEL 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 1.2 (2007), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf. 
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(1)  Purpose of the Use 
 
This factor no longer favors fair use. First, unlike when 
the judge appropriated Brenda’s work-product, the second 
attorney’s use of it was commercial as the attorney was being 
paid for writing the second brief.185  
Second, the new brief was not significantly transforma-
tive as it was briefing the same legal issues in the same way. 
On the other hand, the use does serve a similar educational 
and law making purpose as before except that, of course, it is 
now being used to influence the development of the law 
rather than to announce it. With the educational role 
weakened and the commercialization increased, this factor 
now tips against fair use. 
 
(2)  Nature of the Work 
 
The nature of the work factor’s analysis is the same as 
when  the  judge  appropriated  Brenda’s  expression,186  so  it 
favors fair use. 
 
(3)  Amount Copied 
Again, the amount copied analysis is identical to the one 
of the court’s use of Brenda’s brief,187 so the factor disfavors 
fair use. 
(4)  Effect on Brenda’s Market 
 
The effect of copying factor differs from the analysis of 
the court’s use of the brief. If an attorney who feels 
compelled to copy another attorney’s brief on a complicated 
issue is not allowed to do so, there is a significant chance that 
                                            
185 Only if the second attorney was functioning purely as a pro bono 
counsel would this not be true. If the attorney received any benefit – 
credit towards promotion in a firm’s pro bono program or a salary from 
an advocacy group, etc. – the purpose of the use will be tainted with 
commercialism. 
186 See Section IV.F.1.a.(2), supra. 
187 See Section IV.F.1.a.(3), supra. 
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more  experienced  counsel  will  be  retained.188  Of  these 
consultations, some of them would likely be with attorneys in 
Brenda position.189 As a consequence, this factor tips away 
from fair use. 
 
(5)  The Fifth  Factor— 
Legal System Considerations 
 
This factor, as when the judge quoted Brenda’s brief,190 
favors a fair use finding. 
 
(6)  Conclusion 
 
In the case of the second attorney copying Brenda’s brief, 
three of the four factors weigh against a fair use finding. 
Particularly because the use is commercial without a 
countervailing transformation of the copied work,191 a court 
is unlikely to determine that the defense has been established. 
Consequently, a violation of the Copyright Act most likely 
occurred. 
 
(c)  Research System Copying Her Expression 
 
A fair use finding is least likely for the research system’s 
copying of Brenda’s brief. The analysis of most of the factors 
is the same as when the attorney copied the work,192 but the 
purpose of the use factor now clearly suggests that the use is 
not fair. As research services are not free, their use of the 
brief becomes commercial. A commercial use is only fair 
where the other fair use factors overcome the author’s normal 
                                            
188 Cf. MODEL RULES 1.1, cmt. 2 (“Competent representation can also 
be provided through the association of a lawyer of established 
competence in the field in question.”). 
189  A market effect is found if all copyright producers who are 
similarly situated would likely lose value. See note 165, supra with 
accompanying text. 
190 See Section IV.F.1.a.(5), supra. 
191 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 
(1994). 
192 See Section IV.F.1.b, supra. 
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entitlement to compensation.193  This is most likely to be true 
where the appropriated work is highly transformed by the 
copier,194 something that is not true in this hypothetical as an 
exact copy was made. 
 
2.  David Smith Hypothetical— Transactional Work- 
Products195 
 
The fair use situation changes when non-litigation 
documents are analyzed. Overall, the probability of a fair use 
finding decreases. 
 
(a)  Purpose of the Use 
 
This first factor strongly indicates that Howard’s copying 
of and modifications to David’s contract were not fair. First, 
unlike a litigation work-product, no strong public interest is 
served by its subsequent use as contracts are not generally 
shared with the public at large and, consequently, serve no 
educational purpose. Second, although names and addresses 
may have been changed, the “copyrightable expression in the 
original work [was not] used as raw material, transformed in 
the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights 
and  understandings,” 196   meaning  that  no  significant 
transformation occurred. Finally, the use of the contract by a 
competing attorney is a fundamentally commercial use.197 
These three facts establish that the purpose of the use factor 
disfavors fair use. 
 
(b)  Nature of the Work 
As with a litigation work-product, a contract is a work of 
non-fiction, thus increasing the chances of a fair use finding. 
                                            
193 See Campbell, Inc., 510 U.S. at 585. 
194 See id. at 578–79. 
195 The facts of this hypothetical can be found in Section I.B, supra. 
196 Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 
(2d Cir.1998) (quotation marks omitted). 
197 Cf.  Campbell  v.  Acuff-Rose  Music,  Inc.,  510 U.S. 569, 579 
(1994). 
2008 Intellectual Property Rights 47 
  
In distinction with a litigation document, however, a contract 
is not distributed into a system that maintains public records. 
As a consequence, a contract represents a work that is neither 
published nor distributed which generally implies that a fair 
use finding is not appropriate.198 Although it is possible that 
this statutory factor would be considered to be neutral, most 
courts would likely find that it disfavors a fair use finding. 
 
(c)  Amount Copied 
Again, as the entire contract was copied, this factor 
disfavors a fair use finding. 
 
(d)  Effect on David’s Market 
 
The market effect of copying such as Howard did in the 
hypothetical is likely to adversely affect David’s financial 
and reputational markets. Howard, or any other attorney who 
is similarly situated, has avoided the necessity of either 
referring the matter to a more experience attorney who could 
draft the complicated contract or arranging to have a 
seasoned mentor assist in the drafting of it. Both of these 
impact on the more seasoned attorney’s market. 
 
(e)  The Fifth Factor— Legal System Considerations 
 
Unlike a litigation document which has a direct 
connection to the public interest in the development of the 
law, transactional documents are associated with private 
orderings. A contract serves to establish the details of a legal 
relationship between its parties, but does not serve the 
broader purpose of educating the judge and public about the 
definition of the law. Consequently, there is no interest 
outside of the four statutory factors that is likely to cause a 
court to find fair use. 
 
                                            
    198 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
554 (1985). 
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(f)  Conclusion 
None of the factors in the statute favor a fair use finding. 
There is no outside consideration that would compel a court 
to develop a fifth factor. A finding of fair use, therefore, is 
extraordinarily unlikely. 
        
V.  CONCLUSION 
The determination of whether an attorney’s legal rights 
have been violated by another’s appropriation of a work 
product is not an easy analysis. Most times, the attorney will 
need to consider the competing equitable considerations of a 
copyright fair use analysis and may have to attempt to divine 
the terms of an agreement that were never expressed. Even 
after an analysis is done, the conclusion may be unclear and 
even contradictory. 
As a practical matter, pursuing legal rights may be unwise 
outside of a direct appropriation by another attorney or a 
commercial enterprise. For other parties, an attorney would 
be wise to resolve the issue with due regard for the broader, 
public service considerations of the practice of law. 
